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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW: 
SELECTED U.S. SUPREME COURT, COURT OF ApPEALS, AND DISTRICT COURT 
OPINIONS BETWEEN FEBRUARY 1,2005 AND MAY 1,2006 
TYLER T. OCHOA* 
PRELUDE 
This article highlights nine U.s. copyright law decisions handed down between February 
1, 2005 and May 1, 2006. This review was originally delivered as a speech at The 50th 
Annual Conference of Developments in Intellectual Property Law held by The John Marshall 
Law School Center for Intellectual Property Law on May 26, 2006. Discussing a wide range 
of cases from peer-to-peer file sharing to standing, the analysis focuses on the most recent 
developments in copyright. 
1. RECENT COPYRIGHT CASES 
A. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
Perhaps the biggest development in current copyright law occurred in June 2005, with 
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.1 
Defendants Grokster and StreamCast are companies that distributed software that enabled 
computer users to share and exchange files through a peer-to-peer network.2 On a peer-to­
peer network, computer users exchange their files directly with other users without having 
to go through a centralized server.3 Both Grokster and StreamCast conceded that an 
individual copying music from an unauthorized source using peer-to-peer software is 
committing copyright infringement.4 The question raised by the case was whether the 
providers of such software, such as Grokster and Stream Cast, are contributorily liable for 
infringement committed by individual users.5 
Grokster's defense essentially rested on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.6 In Sony, Universal and Disney filed suit 
against Sony because Sony was selling a television recording device (now commonly referred 
to as a VCR) that enabled consumers to copy the studios' copyrighted works.7 Universal and 
* Professor, High Technology Law Institute, Santa Clara University School of Law. A.B. 1983, J.D. 
1987, Stanford University. Professor Ochoa is a co-author (with Craig Joyce, Marshall Leaffer and Peter 
Jaszi) of COPYRIGHT LAW (LEXIS 7th ed. 2006), the best-selling copyright casebook in the United States. The 
author would like to thank David O. Carson and Jule Sigall of the U.S. Copyright Office for their assistance 
in developing the speech on which this article was based, and the editors of THE JOHN MARSHALL REVIEW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW for their assistance in converting the speech into article form. 
1 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
2 Id. at 2770. 
:J Id. 
4 Id. at 2772. By contrast, some scholars and amici contend that copying for personal use often is not 
an infringement, either, because of the fair use doctrine or because of the limitation contained in 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1008. See, e. g. , J. Glynn Lunney, Jr., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents, 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005), available at 2005 WL 508116; 
Niels B. Schaum ann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1001, 
1023-36 (2002). 
5 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775. 
G Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
Id. at 419-20. 
40 
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Disney argued that individual consumers used Sony's recording device to infringe their 
copyrighted television broadcasts, and that Sony was liable for copyright infringement 
because Sony marketed the recording device for that purpose.8 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, which had held Sony liable for 
contributory copyright infringement, holding that Sony did not infringe on Universal's 
copyrights.9 There were two parts to the Supreme Court's decision in Sony. First, the Court 
held that a majority of consumers used the VCR to record programs to view them at a later 
time, which, according to the Court, "enlarges the television viewing audience" and is a fair 
use.lO Second, the Court held that the fact some people use the VCR for infringement did not 
mean Sony, the manufacturer, was liable for that infringement, because the VCR was 
capable of substantial or commercially significant non-infringing use.1 1  The Sony holding 
helped Grokster and Stream Cast survive contributory copyright infringement claims both at 
the district court and appellate court levels in MGM v. Grokster.12 
While A & M Records v. Napster13 also dealt with file sharing, it is distinguishable from 
Grokster. In Napster, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster's peer-to-peer file-sharing service 
contributorily infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights.14 Unlike Grokster's and StreamCast's 
software, however, Napster's software utilized a centralized index. When installed on a 
user's computer, Napster's software would send all of the file names stored in a designated 
directory on the user's hard drive to the central server, and the server would search through 
those file names and would display the file names for other users to download.15 The Ninth 
Circuit held Napster's software to be contributory infringement and enjoined the service.16 
Grokster and Stream Cast, by contrast, did not maintain a centralized index to help 
users find infringing files.17 Grokster's software placed portions of its index on several 
different users' computers (designated "supernodes") to facilitate searches;  whereas 
Stream Cast's Morpheus software simply compares search requests with the existing indexes 
already maintained on each individual user's computer.18 Since there is no central server, 
there is nothing to enjoin. Basically, even if the distribution of the Grokster or Morpheus 
software is shut down, all of the people who own the software can continue to use it. In order 
to prove contributory infringement against a service like Grokster or Morpheus, therefore, 
the alleged contribution to the infringement must have occurred further back in time. In 
other words, whereas in Napster, plaintiffs could allege that Napster's participation in 
maintaining the central index constituted contributory infringement, in Grokster that 
argument was not available to MGM and the other plaintiffs ; instead, they had to allege that 
the contributory infringement was in the distribution of software itself. 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Grokster held that this factor was significant in ruling 
that Grokster's software had substantial non-infringing uses.19 This was supported by 
evidence suggesting that at least ten percent of the people using the Grokster software were 
using it for non-infringing purposes.20 On appeal, however, the U.s. Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding.21 The Court disagreed with Grokster's 
reliance on Sony, stating that "Sony barred secondary liability based on presuming or 
8 Id. at 420. 
9 Id. at 420-21. 
10 Id. at 421; see also id. at 442-56. 
II Id. at 442; see also id. at 434-42. 
12 Metro·Goldwyn·Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2774-75 (2005). 
13 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
1 1 See id. at 1019-22. 
1 5 Id. at 1011-12. 
11> See id. at 1022. 
1 7 Metro·Goldwyn·Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2771 (2005). 
1 8 Id. 
E! See id. at 2774-75. 
20 Id. at 2772. 
21 Id. at 2777-78. 
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imputing intent to cause infringement" when the only evidence provided was that even 
though the "product [was] capable of substantial lawful use," the distributor knew that it was 
being used for infringement.22 The Court went on to reason that when a party claiming 
contributory liability can produce evidence that "goes beyond a product's characteristics or 
the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions 
directed to promoting infringement," Sony no longer prevents recovery.23 In sum, the Court 
held that if a company "distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe on 
copyrights, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, [then it is] liable for the resulting acts of infringement .... "24 
At first blush, there is nothing new about the Supreme Court ruling. Inducement 
liability existed in patent law before Grokster, and simply applying inducement theory to 
copyright law, another area of intellectual property, is not unusual.2 5 Yet, upon further 
examination, the measure of proof the Supreme Court used in Grokster signals a change in 
the manner in which inducement has traditionally been applied. Whereas inducement 
traditionally required communication of an inducing message to the alleged direct infringers, 
the Supreme Court seemed to suggest that whether such communication actually occurred 
was irrelevant, so long as the evidence demonstrated that the alleged contributory infringer 
subjectively intended to encourage such infringement.26 That represents a significant 
relaxation of the traditional standard for demonstrating inducement. In addition, the 
evidence that the Court relied upon to demonstrate such subjective intent is extremely 
problematic. 
First, in Grokster, MGM presented evidence that Grokster and Stream Cast were 
"aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement, [namely,] the 
market comprising former Napster users."27 However, after Napster folded, many of 
companies wanted to market their products to former Napster users. For example, Apple 
iTunes wants to sell its products and services to former Napster users. The difference, of 
course, is that Apple iTunes is compensating authors whereas Grokster and Stream Cast 
were not. It is only by assuming a priori that the lack of compensation makes the service 
itself unlawful that the Court could conclude that marketing to former Napster users was 
somehow sinister. 
Second, MGM presented evidence that Grokster and Stream Cast never "attempted to 
develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their 
software."28 However, the Supreme Court in Grokster emphasized that Sony could be 
overcome only when a party can show that the contributory infringer distributed a device 
"with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or 
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement."29 The act of not developing filtering 
tools is not an affirmative step taken to foster infringement; it is a negative step. By relying 
in part on the defendants' omissions, the Supreme Court's decision effectively imposes a duty 
on software manufacturers to take active steps to try to reduce infringement. Even though 
the Court says in footnote twelve that "in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court 
would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take 
22 Id. at 2778. 
2:J Id. at 2779. 
21 Id. at 2764. 
25 Indeed, other Courts of Appeals had already recognized inducement as a species of contributory 
liability for copyright infringement. See, e. g., Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1963) ("one who, with knowledge of infringing activity, induces, causes or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer.") 
(emphasis added); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019 (same; quoting Gershwin). 
2G Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780-81. 
27 Id. at 2781. 
28 Id. at 2781. 
29 Id. at 2780 (emphasis added). 
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affirmative steps," 30 no responsible legal counsel would advise his or her client that it need 
not take such affirmative steps. 
Third, MGM presented evidence that Grokster and Stream Cast profited from the 
infringement "by selling advertising space, by directing ads to the screens of computer 
employing their software."31 MGM used this evidence to reason that the more infringement 
occurs through the use of defendants' software, the more the total volume of use increases, 
and, as a result, the more defendants' advertising profit increases.32 However, a search 
engine such as Google capitalizes on high-volume use through advertising as well, yet most 
people would not consider that fact to be evidence that Google intended to induce 
infringement. What makes the advertiser-supported business model suspicious is not the 
business model itself, but the fact that such a high percentage of the uses were alleged to be 
infringing. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with the legal concept of a third party inducing 
copyright infringement. Nevertheless, the ambiguous evidence relied upon by the U.s. 
Supreme Court in Grokster to establish unlawful intent to induce infringement is worrisome. 
It seems to me that the Supreme Court thinks it is going to be easy to distinguish 
"legitimate" companies, like Sony and Apple, from what it views as fly-by-night infringers, 
like Napster or Grokster. It may not prove that easy in practice. 
The Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Grokster on the basis of a disagreement 
over the application of Sony.33 There was a big dispute as to what Sony meant, and 
especially as to the proper interpretation of the phrase "capable of substantial non-infringing 
use."34 In Sony, more than two thirds of the use of the VCR was held to be fair use -
consumers using the device to record a program in its entirety and view it at a later time 
("time shifting").35 The facts in Grokster posed a more difficult question: what happens if a 
company's software is capable of substantial non-infringing use, but ninety percent of the 
software's users are using it to infringe?36 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court completely 
dodged the question in Grokster, holding only that "Sony did not displace other theories of 
secondary liability," and that it was error to grant summary judgment on inducement.37 All 
that the Supreme Court in Grokster decisively concluded about Sony is that "the Ninth 
Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony."38 
Why was the court content to "leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day 
when that may be required"?39 Although Grokster was a unanimous decision, the Supreme 
Court was in fact completely split about the meaning of Sony, as demonstrated by the two 
concurring opinions.4 o The first, comprised of three justices led by Justice Ginsburg, 
suggests that contributory liability arises when a product is used overwhelmingly to infringe, 
even though it is capable of non-infringing use.41 The second, comprised of three justices led 
by Justice Breyer, prefers a clear rule permitting contributory liability only "when the 
product in question will be used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights."42 
What does this mean for the future? It was relatively easy for companies to avoid 
liability under Sony, which was an objective standard that focused on the capabilities of the 
device. Under Grokster, however, the question is now a subjective standard of actual intent 
:30 Id. at 2781 n. 12. 
31 Id. at 2781. 
:32 Id. at 2781-82. 
:3:3 Id. at 2778. 
34 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 ( 1984). 
:35 Id. at 424 n.4, 447-56. 
:3G Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772. 
37 Id. at 2778. 
:38 Id. at 2779. 
:39 Id. 
40 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
11 Id. at 2786 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
12 Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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to cause infringement. The problem with that standard, however, is not only is it going to be 
extremely difficult for software companies to meet, but questions of whether the company 
meets the standard will rarely be resolvable on summary judgment. 
B. BMG Music v. Gonzalez 
Turning to a different peer-to-peer file sharing case, the Seventh Circuit in BMG Music 
v. Gonzalezi3 presents the first analysis of whether peer-to-peer file sharing is a copyright 
infringement or a fair use. Gonzalez is the first case against an individual accused of peer­
to-peer file sharing to reach the Court of Appeals level. Ms. Gonzalez had 1,370 songs saved 
on the hard drive of her personal computer, some, if not most, of which were downloaded 
using peer-to-peer file sharing software.44 Ms. Gonzalez claimed that she owned CDs for 
most of the 1,370 songs, and that putting music from her own CDs onto her hard drive was a 
fair use.4 5  BMG chose not to pursue infringement claims on the 1,340 songs Ms. Gonzalez 
claimed she copied from CDs she owned.46 However, BMG did pursue infringement claims 
for the thirty songs for which Ms. Gonzalez did not own legitimate copies, alleging she 
downloaded the thirty songs in question using a peer-to-peer file sharing service, and thereby 
infringed the copyrights of each of those songs.47 
Ms. Gonzalez conceded that she had downloaded those songs, but she argued that she 
was merely sampling the downloaded music so that she could listen to the songs and decide 
whether or not to buy the songs. Ms. Gonzalez argued that sampling for this purpose is a 
fair use.4S The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, noting that the only case on point 
held that downloading songs without paying for them, even if the downloader plans to 
purchase a legal copy later, is infringement. 49 The court added that not only is free 
downloading a substitute for actually purchasing the CD, but downloading also competes 
with licensed webcasts and sales.50 One can listen to a song on the radio and decide whether 
to buy it. The broadcaster has paid a license to broadcast the song, but when one downloads 
it for free the artist never receives any license payment. 51 Downloading a song so the person 
can decide whether to purchase it also competes with authorized sales such as iTunes.52 A 
potential buyer online can typically get a one minute preview, but the preview is not the 
whole song, and it is not something that the buyer downloads and keeps forever. 53 
Consequently, downloading an entire song (even to try it out) is not a fair use.54 
1:J BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005). 
44 Id. at 889. 
15 Id. 
1G Id. at 890-91. 
47 Id. 
18 Id. at 889-90. 
19 Id. at 890. "It is no surprise, therefore, that the only appellate decision on point has held that 
downloading copyrighted songs cannot be defended as fair use, whether or not the recipient plans to buy 
songs she likes well enough to spring for. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 
(9th Cir. 2001); see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding 
that downloads are not fair use even if the downloader already owns one purchased copy). " Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
50 Id. at 891. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
5:J Id. 
54 Id. 
Copyright law lets authors make their own decisions about how best to promote their 
works; copiers such as Gonzalez cannot ask courts (and juries) to second· guess the market 
and call wholesale copying "fair use" if they think that authors err in understanding their 
own economic interests or that Congress erred in granting authors the rights in the 
copyright statute. 
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The Seventh Circuit's decision is not a big surprise, as most observers had already 
concluded that individuals using peer-to-peer file-sharing services are subject to copyright 
infringement liability. The Seventh Circuit's opinion merely confirms the assumption that 
peer-to-peer file-sharing is infringement. 
The Gonzalez case also addressed a minor issue regarding a possible defense for peer-to­
peer file-sharers against statutory damages. Section 504(c)(2) provides that if an infringer 
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted infringement, the court may lower 
the minimum statutory damages to $200 per work infringed. 55 Section 402(d), however, 
states "If notice of copyright . . .  appears on the published . . .  phonorecords to which a 
defendant . . .  had access, then no weight shall be given to . . .  [any] defense based on 
innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages."56 Ms. Gonzalez argued 
that the downloaded music did not provide her notice that the music was copyrighted 
because the songs she downloaded did not include copyright notices. 57 That is to be expected; 
people who allow others to make unauthorized copies of their unauthorized copies typically 
do not put a copyright notice on the songs to be downloaded. The court held that if copies 
were available in the marketplace that had notice on them, then Ms. Gonzalez had access to 
adequate copyright notice.58 The court explained that "Ms. Gonzalez readily could have 
learned, had she inquired, that the music was under copyright" by looking for a notice on 
published phonorecords to which she had access, for example, in stores where they were on 
sale.59 The court held that Ms. Gonzalez could not rely on innocent infringement to lower her 
statutory damages, and BMG was awarded the minimum statutory damages allowed, which 
is $750 per work infringed.60 
Ms. Gonzalez's last argument was to claim that all copyright infringers are entitled to a 
jury trial to set the amount of statutory damages, even if there is no question of law and the 
plaintiff is merely seeking the minimum amount of statutory damages.61 Ms. Gonzalez's 
argument was based on a comment in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.62 The 
Seventh Circuit explained that Ms. Gonzalez's argument based on Feltner was misplaced, 
and relied on an inaccurate interpretation of dicta in the case.63 The court said that as long 
as the plaintiffs are only seeking the statutory minimum, there is no right to have a jury 
triaL the minimum amount of statutory damages can be awarded on summary judgment.64 
The award of $22,500 against Ms. Gonzalez was affirmed.65 
C Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co. 
The opinion in Mannion vs. Coors Brewing Company66 develops a new analysis of what 
elements are relevant in analyzing infringement of a copyrightable photograph. The case 
revolves around a picture of NBA basketball star Kevin Garnett taken by Mr. Mannion.67 
Coors was interested in using the picture as part of a billboard advertising campaign, but it 
chose not to deal with Mannion. Instead, Coors selected another photographer to create a 
Id. 
55 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
fiG 17 U.S.C. § 402(d). 
57 Id. at 892. 
58 Id. 
fi�J Id. 
GO Id. 
Gi ld. 
G2 See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998). 
G:J BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888,892-93 (7th Cir. 2005). 
G1 Id. 
Gfi Id. at 893. 
GG Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
G7 Id. at 447. The photograph is reproduced in the reported opinion at page 464. 
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similar picture, which Coors ultimately used in its billboard advertising campaign.68 The 
allegedly infringing picture is not a picture of Kevin Garnett, but it is a picture of someone 
who is dressed similarly, posed in a similar way and shot from a similar angle.69 The 
question is whether the picture used on the Coors Light billboard infringed Mannion's 
copyright in his photograph? 
Judge Kaplan, a very learned copyright judge of the Southern District of New York, 
wrote a lengthy opinion on the copyrightability of photographs. Judge Kaplan started with 
the two-step test to evaluate whether there was infringement. To infringe the copyright in a 
photograph, first, the defendant has to have actually copied the plaintiff's work, and second, 
the copying has to involve a substantial similarity between the defendant's work and 
protectable elements of the plaintiff's work. 70 In this case, access to the plaintiff's work was 
undisputed, and there was ample evidence from which a trier of fact could infer actual 
copying.71 
This reduced the issue in the case to whether there was substantial similarity between 
the defendant's photograph and protectable elements in the plaintiff's work.72 The court's 
analysis first focused on identification of the protectable elements of the photo, specifically 
answering the question: what it is about a photograph, in general, that is protectable by 
copyright?73 Judge Kaplan reviewed case law and treatises identifying three elements in a 
photograph that can protected by copyright, which he termed rendition, timing, and creation 
of the subject. ?4 
Rendition is a general term for the technical aspects or choices involved in creating the 
photograph, which contribute to the photograph's overall originality. 75 Rendition includes :  
the angle of the shot; the use of light and shade; exposure; effects achieved by means of 
filters, developing techniques, type of camera and film.76 The actual technical aspects 
themselves are not protected by copyright, but rather the results or expression they produce 
can be protected. ?7 Also, copyright in rendition does not protect what is depicted, meaning 
the subject matter, but rather how it is depicted.78 Rendition only includes those elements of 
the resultant photograph that constitute expression, which are protectable, though rendition 
may be described in technical terms.79 
Timing is also an element protected by copyright under Judge Kaplan's formulation.8o 
Timing can be described as simply taking a picture at the right place and the right time.81 
An example might be an action photograph of an athlete or wild animal, which has perfect 
composition or drama.82 There was nothing special about the rendition, but there was 
GS Id. at 448. 
G�J Id. The allegedly infringing photograph is reproduced in the reported opinion at page 466. 
70 Id. at 449. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
7:J Id. 
71 Id. at 450-54. 
75 
7G 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Id. at 452. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 452-53. 
Id. at 453. 
A modern work strikingly original in timing might be Catch of the Day, by noted 
wildlife photographer Thomas Mangelsen, which depicts a salmon that appears to be 
jumping into the gaping mouth of a brown bear at Brooks Falls in Katmai National Park, 
Alaska. . . . Copyright based on originality in timing is limited by the principle that 
copyright in a photograph ordinarily confers no rights over the subject matter. Thus, the 
copyright in Catch of the Day does not protect against subsequent photographs of bears 
feasting on salmon in the same location. Furthermore, if another photographer were 
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something unique about the timing. The originality is in the timing of the photograph, not 
the underlying subject, which creates an image that receives copyright protection.83 
As stated above, subject matter generally does not qualify for copyright protection under 
the rendition and timing elements, but there are circumstances where the subject matter can 
qualify for protection.84 When the photographer creates the scene or subject to be 
photographed, as when the photographer stages a photograph, the photographer has created 
a subject that is protectable.85 In simple terms, when a photographer arranges the subject or 
scene of the photograph and then photographs the scene, the photographer has the right to 
prevent others from duplicating those elements of the photograph that are original to the 
photographer.86 
The court then analyzed Mannion's photograph of Kevin Garnett. The court stated that 
there is no serious dispute that the photograph was original, as it was not copied from 
another work and it is original in its rendition: Mannion set up the angle, the lighting, etc.87 
His composition also "evidences originality in the creation of the subject."88 Mannion staged 
the scene, posing Kevin Garnett against the sky, instructing him what to wear and how to 
look, and shot the staged scene from a particular angle. There is originality in the creation of 
the subject.89 
The court went on to say, though, there are limits to how far originality in creation of 
the subject extends.90 Kevin Garnett, himself, is not protectable ; other people can take 
photographs of Kevin Garnett. Other people can take photographs of people against a cloudy 
sky as a backdrop.91 However, if one takes a photograph of a young, fit African-American 
man, wearing similar clothes and jewelry, against a cloudy sky backdrop from the same 
angle, and with the same lighting, he or she may be infringing on the creation of the subject 
element of Mannion's expression.92 
The defendant argued against finding originality in the creation of the subject by raising 
the idea/expression dichotomy, which postulates that ideas may not be copyrighted.93 
Copyright protects only the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.94 The defendant 
argued that the Coors photograph and the Mannion photograph only share "the generalized 
idea and concept of a young African-American man wearing a white T-shirt and large 
amount ofjewelry."95 
Answering this argument, Judge Kaplan seems to break new ground by saying the 
idea/expression dichotomy does not work very well for analyzing infringement of works of 
sufficiently skilled and fortunate to capture a salmon at the precise moment that it 
appeared to enter a hungry bear's mouth · and others have tried, with varying degrees of 
success . that photographer, even if inspired by Mangelsen, would not necessarily have 
infringed his work because Mangelsen's copyright does not extend to the natural world he 
captured. 
Id. Another famous example of timing is the Zap ruder film of John F. Kennedy's assassination. The 
Zap ruder film has copyrightable elements simply because Mr. Zap ruder was at the right place and right time. 
See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 131, 133, 141-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
8:3 Id. 
81 Id. at 453-54. 
85 Id. 
8G Id. 
87 Id. at 454-55. 
88 Id. at 455. 
89 Id. An example of this is the String of Puppies case, Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
Id. at 453-54. The Rogers' photograph, which is now well, known, shows a couple sitting on a bench holding 
eight puppies. Id. at 454. Koons made a sculpture based on the photo, which was held to be infringing. Id. 
So subject matter can be protected, but only if it is a staged shot, meaning that the photographer created the 
subject matter. Id. 
�JO Id. at 455. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
�J3 See 17 U.S.C. § l02(b). 
91 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 455. 
95 Id. 
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visual art.96 The idea/expression dichotomy arose in the context of literary works, where it is 
fairly easy to separate the underlying ideas of a literary work from the expression that is 
used to convey the ideas.97 However, in the case of a visual work of art, Judge Kaplan asks, 
what is the idea? It is frequently difficult to identify the particular idea captured, embodied, 
or conveyed by a work of visual art.98 Every observer creates a different interpretation of 
every visual work of art.99 It is not clear that there is any real distinction between the idea 
behind a work of visual art and the expression of that idea.10 o  Judge Kaplan concludes the 
idea behind a picture is manifest in its own expression, and therefore ideas expressed in 
photographs can be protected.101 
The opinion that the idea/expression dichotomy is not useful or relevant for analyzing 
infringement in the context of visual works of art probably will be controversial. One 
problem appears to be that, while Judge Kaplan agrees that subject matter is not generally 
protectable, this seems to be inconsistent with his position that the idea/expression 
dichotomy cannot be used defensively for works of visual art. Many observers may find it 
difficult to separate the concepts of subject matter and idea/expression dichotomy in a 
meaningful way. 
After analyzing the plaintiffs photograph, Judge Kaplan finally reached the ultimate 
question, whether there is substantial similarity between the plaintiff's work and the 
defendant's work. Judge Kaplan ruled that overall the photograph has protectable 
expression, though some aspects of the photo are individually unprotectable.102 He implied 
that since it is obvious that the defendant actually copied Mannion's photograph and that 
some of the elements copied may be protectable elements, the defendant's motion to dismiss 
the complaint should be denied.103 On the other hand, the cloudy sky, Kevin Garnett's pose, 
his T-shirt, and his jewelry are not individually protectable, and there are enough differences 
in the conception of the two photographs that the plaintiffs motion to grant summary 
judgment for infringement also should be denied.104 The Court ruled that there were enough 
triable issues of fact, and that a "reasonable jury could find substantial similarity either 
present or absent." 105 
9G 
�J7 
98 
99 
100 
Id. at 458-60. 
Id. at 458. 
Id . 
Id. 
Id. at 460-61. 
A good example is Rogers v. Koons, in which the court observed that "it is not . . .  the 
idea of a couple with eight small puppies seated on a bench that is protected, but rather 
Rogers' expression of this idea" as caught in the placement, in the particular light, and in 
the expressions of the subjects . . . .  " But "a couple with eight small puppies seated on a 
bench" is not necessarily the idea of Puppies, which just as easily could be "people with 
dogs on their laps," "the bliss of owning puppies, " or even a sheepishly ironic thought such 
as "Ha hal This might look cute now, but boy are these puppies going to be a lot of work!" 
Rather, "a couple with eight small puppies seated on a bench" is nothing more or less 
than what "a young African American man wearing a white T'shirt and a large amount of 
jewelry" is: a description of the subject at a level of generality sufficient to avoid 
implicating copyright protection for an original photograph. Other copyright cases that 
have referred to the "idea" of a photograph also used "idea" to mean a general description of 
the subject or subject matter . . . .  Thus another photographer may pose a couple with eight 
puppies on a bench, . . .  or take a picture of a black man in white athletic wear and showy 
jewelry. In each case, however, there would be infringement (assuming actual copying and 
ownership of a valid copyright) if the subject and rendition were sufficiently like those in 
the copyrighted work. 
Id. at 460. 
1 0 1  Id. at 461. 
IO� Id. at 462-63 . 
lOB Id. 
1 01 Id. at 463. 
1 05 Id. 
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The opinion defines triable issues of fact for copyright infringement of photographs. I 
think the three-part categorization of protectable elements in a photograph will be quite 
influential. Whether or not the idea/expression part of Judge Kaplan's opinion will prove 
influential is somewhat more questionable. Mannion vs. Coors Brewing Company is an 
important leading opinion on copyright law in the area of infringement of works of visual art, 
and it will affect many future opinions and analyses. 
D. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertainment Distributing 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertainment Distributing10G is the case resulting 
from the remand of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 107 a case which 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court a few years ago. In that case, Doubleday published General 
Eisenhower's written memoirs of World War II in 1948, titling it Crusade in Europe.lOS 
Twentieth Century Fox ("Fox") obtained the rights to make a television series based on the 
book.109 The television series was also entitled Crusade in Europe, and was first broadcast in 
1949.110 Both the book and the television series were registered for copyright, but Fox 
neglected to renew the copyright on the television series, allowing it to enter the public 
domain.111 In the 1990s, Dastar produced a lightly edited derivative work based on the 
television series, titled World War II Campaigns in Europe.112 Fox sued Dastar for copyright 
infringement, not for infringing the television series, but for infringing the underlying 
book.113 (Fox still held the rights to the original book, after re-acquiring the rights in 
1988.114) Fox also included in its complaint a claim for violation of Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act for failing to credit Fox as the original producer of the revised television 
series.115 The U.s. Supreme Court held Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act applies only to the 
producer of tangible goods or services, and does not apply to the creator of intangible 
intellectual property.116 In essence, Section 43(a) was out of the case. 
However, the claim that the edited television series infringed the copyright on 
Eisenhower's book still remained. That claim hinged on whether the copyright in the book 
was properly renewed, which in turn depended upon whether it was a work made for hire.ll7 
Section 24 of the 1909 Copyright Act states that in the case of "any work copyrighted . . .  by 
an employer for whom such work is made for hire," the proprietor of the copyright is entitled 
to the renewaP1S In the case of other copyrighted work not created as a work-for-hire, the 
right of renewal passes to the widow, widower, or children of the author.119 
If the book was considered a work-for-hire, Doubleday could renew the copyright. Since 
Doubleday did file for such a renewal, the copyright would be valid and the infringement 
case could go forward. If it was not a work made for hire, then the heirs of Eisenhower had 
the right to renew the copyright. But because the heirs never filed a renewal claim, the work 
would have entered the public domain. Thus, the simple question is whether the book is a 
work made for hire within the meaning of the 1909 Act. 
lOG Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm't Distrib., 429 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2005). 
1 07 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
108 Id. at 25. 
1 09 Id. at 25-26. 
1 1 0 Id. at 26. 
m Id. 
II� Id. 
II:l Id.at 27. 
114 Id. at 26. 
1 1 5 Id. 
IIG Id. at 37. 
117 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm't Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 2005). 
liS Id. 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed). 
1 1 9 Id. 
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Under the 1976 Copyright Act, the current law, a work made for hire is a work made by 
an employee within the scope of his or her employment, or a work made by an independent 
contractor, but only if it falls within one of nine categories and there is a signed written 
agreement.120 Unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a signed written 
agreement, the copyright in a work made for hire is owned by the employer or other person 
for whom the work is commissioned.121 
Under the 1909 Act, there was a more generous standard for works made for hire - it 
did not matter if a person was an employee or an independent contractor.122 "[I]n the 
absence of an express contractual reservation of the copyright in the artist, the presumption 
arises that the mutual intent of the parties is that the title to the copyright shall be [owned 
by] the person at whose instance and expense the work is done." 123 The question, therefore, 
is whether the Eisenhower memoirs were written at the "instance and expense" of 
Doubleday.124 That is a pretty broad interpretation, because the statute states, "any work 
copyrighted ... by an employer for whom such work is made for hire." 125 This language could 
have been restricted solely to employers and employees and not include independent 
contractors at all. But, since the 1960s, all of the Courts of Appeals have agreed that 
independent contractors are included if they meet this instance and expense test.l26 
The Ninth Circuit held two-to-one that Eisenhower's memoirs were written at the 
instance and expense of Doubleday.127 One of the big factors in the decision was that 
Eisenhower did not begin writing until after he reached an agreement with Doubleday.128 
Doubleday also exercised more than their usual supervision, including regular meetings with 
Eisenhower and giving him extensive notes and comments.129 Additionally, Doubleday took 
the entire financial risk - paying all of Eisenhower's expenses and hiring staff to work with 
h· 130 1m. 
The dissent disagreed, stating that "Eisenhower sold Doubleday a product, not his 
services," 131 and pointing out that at the time the work was written, "work for hire" meant 
there must be an employer-employee relationship.132 The "work made for hire" portion of the 
statute was not applied to independent contractors until the 1960s.133 In this case, the work 
was commissioned in 1948, so it could not have been a work made for hire within the 
meaning of the statute because that only applied to employees at the time.134 
In addition, the contract states that Eisenhower was assigning to Doubleday his 
manuscript and all of the rights.135 If Doubleday already owned the rights by virtue of the 
work made for hire doctrine, then there was no need for an assignment. Also, the tax 
treatment shows that Eisenhower was paid for the transfer of a capital asset rather than 
120 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201, 101. "To determine whether a work is for hire under the [Copyright] Act [of 
1976], a court first should ascertain, using principles of general common law of agency, whether the work was 
prepared by an employee or an independent contractor. After making this determination, the court can apply 
the appropriate subsection of § 101. " Community for Creative Non'Violence v. Reid, 490 US 730, 750-51 
(1989). 
1 2 1  17 U.S.C. § 201. 
122 Twentieth Century Fo x, 429 F.3d at 877. 
1 2:3 Id. (quoting Lin'Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965). 
1 21 Id. at 878-79. 
125 Id. at 876. 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24. 
1 26 Id. at 877-78. 
1 27 Id. at 879. 
128 Id. 
1 29 Id. at 880. 
1 :30 Id. at 881. 
131 Id. at 885-86 (D. W. Nelson, dissenting). 
1 :32 Id. at 886. 
I:n Id. 
134 Id. 
1 :35 Id. at 887. "The contract states: 'I hereby sell, assign, transfer and set over unto Doubleday . . .  the 
manuscript . . .  and all rights of every nature pertaining thereto. '" Id. 
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paid for personal income for his services in writing the book. 136 The majority did not find this 
persuasive. Instead, the majority affirmed the finding that Eisenhower's memoirs were a 
work made for hire; therefore, the renewal made by Doubleday was valid and the judgment 
of copyright infringement was affirmed. 
E. Venegas-Hernandez v. Asociacion de Compositores y Editores de Musica Latinoamericana 
("A CEMLA ") 
Venegas Hernandez v. ACEMLA137 is another case involving ownership of copyrighted 
works. ACEMLA is the Latin American collective licensing association whose powers are 
similar to the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("AS CAP") and 
Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI").138 This case involves ownership of the renewal copyrights for 
Puerto Rican composer Guillermo Venegas-Lloveras, who died in 1993.139 There was a 
dispute between his widow and surviving children as to who owns the copyrights to his 
works.140 The 1976 Act contains essentially the same language as the 1909 Act: if the work 
is not a work-for-hire, then the renewal rights go to the author if still living and to the 
"widow, widower, or children of the author" if the author is not living.141 It is clear that the 
widow and surviving children jointly own the copyright, but in what shares? If it is a per 
capita distribution of the copyright, the surviving spouse and the four surviving children 
each own twenty percent of the copyright. But if it is a per stirpes distribution, the surviving 
spouse owns fifty percent of the copyright, and each of the four surviving children own 12.5 
percent of the copyright. So the dispute was over the amount of royalties to be distributed 
between the surviving spouse and the surviving children. 142 
The district court held that a per capita distribution was appropriate, citing only the 
Copyright Act and Nimmer on Copyright.143 But in January 2005, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the statute should be interpreted to require a per stirpes distribution.144 In Venegas­
Hernandez, the First Circuit makes a comparison with the termination provisions of the 
1976 Act, which explicitly allow an author to terminate an assignment and then to take one's 
copyright rights back.145 If the author is dead, the termination interests are exercised by the 
widow or widower, unless there are surviving children or grandchildren, in which case, the 
widow or widower owns one half and the other half is divided among the children.146 
Thus, the termination rights expressly provide for a per stirpes distribution. The 
question is : should the 1909 Act be interpreted to also require a per stirpes distribution, 
despite the fact that it is nowhere near as explicit as the 1976 Act? In other words, did the 
1976 Act change the former rule under the 1909 Act, or did it merely clarify it? The First 
Circuit noted that the Sixth Circuit had reasoned that termination rights are per stirpes, and 
that renewal rights should therefore be per stirpes too. The First Circuit in this case agreed 
with the Sixth Circuit, finding that a per stirpes division is preferable on policy grounds.147 
This decision avoids a split with the Sixth Circuit, as both the First and the Sixth 
Circuits agree that the distribution of copyright renewal rights is per stirpes. There is a 
1 :36 Id. at 887-88. 
137 Venegas' Hernandez v. Asociacion de Compositores y Editores de Musica Latinoamericana 
(ACEMLA), 424 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005). 
1 :38 Id. at 52. 
139 Id. at 51. 
1 10 Id. at 52, 53. 
1 1 1  Id. at 53. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed); 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(c). 
142 Venegas'Hernandez, 424 F.3d at 54. 
1 1 :3 See Venegas'Hernandez v. Peer, 283 F. Supp. 2d 491, 503-05 (D.P.R. 2003). 
1 11 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2005). 
145 Venegas'Hernandez, 424 F.3d at 55. 
1 16 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(A),(B); § 304(c)(2)(A),(B). 
1 1 7  Id. at 56. 
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potential split here with the Second Circuit, which previously assumed that a per capita 
distribution was appropriate without expressly addressing the issue.148 Prior to this opinion, 
the U.S. Copyright Office had also expressed the opinion that a per capita distribution was 
appropriate. However, it is in the best interest of the Copyright Office to have a clear rule. 
If a circuit split develops, the Supreme Court might have to address this issue. But for now, 
the only two Circuits that have expressly decided the issue are the First and the Sixth 
Circuit. Both hold that renewal rights under the 1909 Act that were carried forward under 
the 1976 Act should be exercised on a per stirpes basis. 
F La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire 
La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire149 is case arising out of the Tenth 
Circuit that raises a fairly straightforward question of when a party has standing to sue for 
copyright infringement. Essentially, the question before the court was when a party is 
deemed to have registered its work with the U.S. Copyright Office: either "1) registration 
occurs when the copyright owner submits an application for registration to the copyright 
office, or, conversely, 2) registration occurs when the copyright office actually approves or 
rejects the application."150 The question of standing turns on resolution of this issue, because 
the court does not have federal jurisdiction over a copyright infringement action until 
"registration of the copyright claim has been made .... "151 
In La Resolana, the plaintiff submitted a copyright application for architectural 
drawings with the Copyright Office on November 6, 2003.152 Before the Copyright Office 
approved the application, the plaintiff filed suit for infringement.153 The defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiff "could not sue for copyright infringement until 
it obtained a certificate of copyright registration from the Copyright Office." 154 In response, 
plaintiff simply attached a letter from the Copyright Office, without the certificate of 
registration (which the plaintiff had not received at the time), stating that "all the necessary 
materials had been received" and that the registration would be effective on November 19, 
2003.155 However, the letter was found to be inadmissible hearsay by the district court, and 
plaintiff did not appeal the evidentiary determination, thus waiving it on appeaP56 
The Tenth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court, holding that "registration 
occurs when the copyright office actually approves or rejects the application." 157 In choosing 
this approach, the Tenth Circuit aligns itself with the interpretation of the Eleventh 
Circuit.l58 In contrast, the opposing view that registration occurs when the completed 
application is received is supported by the Fifth Circuit and by Nimmer's copyright 
treatise.159 The rationale underlying the Fifth Circuit's interpretation is policy-based; 
1 18 See Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 949 (2d Cir. 1975) (Van Graafeiland, J., 
dissenting) (noting that under majority decision, widow and two surviving children will each receive one·third 
of royalties during renewal). 
1 19 La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1200-05 (10th Cir. 2005). 
1 50 Id. at 1197. 
151 Id. at 1200; 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000). 
1 5� La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197. 
1 5:3 Id. 
154 Id. 
1 55 Id. at 1197-98. 
1 56 Id. at 1198. The Tenth Circuit commented that the letter from the Copyright Office "should have 
been sufficient evidence of registration " but since the District Court had rejected the plaintiffs "offer of 
proof," and the plaintiff did not appeal the evidentiary issue, the Court accepted "the determination that 
registration had not occurred at the time the court entered its order of dismissal." Id. at 1208. 
157 Id. at 1197. 
1 58 Id. at 1202-03. 
1 59 Id. at 1203-05. 
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"because a copyright owner can sue regardless of whether an application for registration is 
ultimately granted or rejected, delaying the date on which a copyright owner can sue is a 
senseless formality." 160 On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit's agreement with the "actually 
approves" rule rests its reasoning on the "plain language" of Title 17 of the United States 
Code.161 Even though there is a split in the courts, the best thing to do from a practitioner's 
standpoint is to seek expedited registration to make sure that the application has been 
granted before filing suit, because that will satisfy both the stricter Tenth Circuit test and 
the more lenient Fifth Circuit test. 
G. Field v. Coogle, Inc. 
Google, Inc. has recently been involved in a few interesting copyright cases. The first of 
these cases is Field v. Coogle, Inc., 162 from the District of Nevada. The issue in that case was 
whether the Google search engine infringed Field's copyright by reproducing and distributing 
copies of cached versions of his website.163 Google uses what it calls a "Googlebot" to 
continuously crawl across the Internet and gather available Web pages to be catalogued into 
Google's searchable web index.164 During this process, a copy of each webpage analyzed is 
stored in a temporary repository called a "cache." 165 When a link to the webpage is returned 
in response to a search query, often an additional link is provided that says "cached." 166 
Clicking on this link will display the archival copy of the webpage stored in Google's 
system.167 It is this storage and retrieval function of the Google site that was disputed in this 
case.168 
The plaintiff, Blake A. Field, is an author and attorney in Nevada who filed suit in April 
2004 against Google for copying and distributing his copyrighted work.169 In January 2004, 
Field created, copyrighted, and published fifty-one works on his own website.17 o He sued 
Google for $2,550,000 in statutory damages ($50,000 for each of fifty-one copyrighted works) 
and injunctive relieP71 Specifically, Field argued that his copyrights were infringed by the 
act of a user clicking on the "Cached" link on the Google website, not when the "Googlebot" 
made initial copies of the webpages and stored them in the cache.172 
The foundation for the court's finding of no infringement was that Google's activity in 
the process of a user requesting a webpage by clicking the "Cached" link was passive. The 
court pointed out that "it is the user, not Google, who creates and downloads a copy of the 
cached webpage."173 The court stated that "automated, non-volitional conduct by Google in 
response to a user's request does not constitute direct infringement under the Copyright 
Act." 174 This reasoning is a theme that has run through other past copyright decisions. An 
early case in this line was the Netcom case, decided in the Northern District of California in 
1995.175 The court found that the defendant took no affirmative steps to copy the plaintiffs 
lGO Id. at 1204. 
11>1 Id. at 1202, 1205. 
lG� Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
lG:l Id. at 1109, 1115. 
11>4 Id. at 1110. 
lG5 Id. 
lG6 Id. at 1111. 
IG7 Id. 
lG8 Id. at 1110. 
lG9 Id. 
170 Id. at 1110, 1114. 
1 71 Id. at 1110. 
1 7� Id. at 1115. 
17:1 Id. 
1 7� Id. 
1 75 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On'Line Communc'n Servs., 907 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ca. 1995). 
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works, and there was no direct copyright infringement because some element of volitional 
conduct is necessary for liability.176 The same rule was also used in the CoStar case, decided 
by the Fourth Circuit in 2004.177 The court found that the defendant's software was merely a 
conduit for the copiers, and that its passive storage of the plaintiffs photographs did not 
constitute copying.l78 The conclusion drawn from this line of cases is that automated, non­
volitional conduct does not constitute direct infringement. 
In Field v. Google, the court also found that Google held an implied license to reproduce 
and distribute copies of the copyrighted works at issue.179 There are widely recognized and 
well publicized industry standard protocols used by website owners to instruct search 
engines like Google about what preferences the owner has.180 Each website has an embedded 
"meta-tag" and "robots.txt" file that the search engine reads while it is visiting the page.l8l 
Using these features, a website owner can direct a search engine not to display a "Cached" 
link in search results, or even tell the search engine not to post the website at all in search 
results.182 Plaintiff Blake Field was aware of the ability to prevent the "Googlebot" from 
providing links to his cached website and the ability to prevent the search engine from listing 
his web page.183 The court concluded that since Field had this knowledge, but chose not to 
insert a "no-archive" meta-tag, he was making a conscious decision to permit Google to offer 
a "Cached" link to his website.184 Field's implied license to Google to use his website in this 
manner defeated his own copyright claim.185 A website owner must proactively opt-out of the 
reach of search engines if he does not want the site copied. If a website owner fails to opt­
out, an implied license has been given to any search engine to list the site and to offer a 
"Cached" link to it. 
The court further stated that "Field has long been aware that Google automatically 
provides 'Cached' links for pages that are included in its index and search results unless 
instructed otherwise. Field decided to manufacture a claim for copyright infringement 
against Google in the hopes of making money from Google's standard practice."l86 Because 
Google was unaware of Field's true intent, the court concluded that Field was estopped from 
maintaining an action for copyright infringement against Google.187 
Finally, the court also concluded, in the alternative, that Google's conduct was a fair use 
of Field's copyrighted works.188 In Kelly v. Arriba Soft, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of 
thumbnail images by an internet search engine was not infringement of the plaintiffs 
copyrighted photographs.189 The Court specified that the search engine's use of the images 
was a transformative use that "added a further purpose or different character" to the 
copyrighted works and did not "supersede the object of the originals."l90 Similarly, Google's 
use of the cached web pages was deemed to be a transformative use, even though it was a 
verbatim reproduction of copyrighted materiaP9l Field's work was creative, but it had been 
made available on the internet without charge; and copying the entire web page was 
necessary to facilitate Google's purpose of providing access to pages, which are otherwise 
1 76 Id. at 1382. 
177 CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004). 
1 78 Id. at 555. 
1 79 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
180 Id. at 1112. 
1 81 Id. 
1 8� Id. at 1113. 
18:1 Id. 
1 81 Id. at 1116. 
1 85 Id. 
18G Id. at 1113. 
1 87 Id. at 1116-17. 
1 88 Id. at 1117-23; see 17 U.S.C § 107. 
189 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003). 
1 90 Id. at 818. 
1 91 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1119-20. 
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unavailable, and to provide an archival or comparative function.192 Google's use of cached 
links was in good faith and had no effect on the market, so it was considered a fair use and 
not copyright infringement.193 
H Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc. 
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 194 also involves Google, but it involves Google's image search 
engine. Perfect 10 publishes an adult magazine that has a subscription-only website 
displaying photographs of nude models.195 Perfect lO's website was infringed by a third 
party, who copied a photograph of a popular model, Vibe Sorenson, and put it up on his 
infringing website.196 
Google has an image search engine, that, when searched, displays a page containing 
multiple "thumbnails," or lower resolution, smaller versions of the images.197 These images, 
from all over the Internet, are indexed by Google's "web crawler" in an automated process, in 
which Google scans websites, then stores and sorts the content of each site into a cache.198 
The thumbnail images are stored on Google's server; however, the full-scale images are 
not.199 Instead, Google stores a link to the third-party website where the full-size image is 
stored.20o The link to the third party site is an "in-line link," and it causes the full-size image 
to be displayed on Google's web page when one clicks on the thumbnail.201 In Perfect 10, 
Google's search engine scanned the third-party website and produced a thumbnail of the 
infringed image of the model, which it placed into Google's image cache.202 
The first issue considered in the case was whether the display of the full sized image by 
Google, through the use of an in-line link, was an unlawful "public display" within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act.203 The court stated that two tests were available : 1) a server 
test, and 2) an incorporation test.204 Under the server test, "display" is the act of sending the 
digital bits of information, the ones and zeros, to a user's computer.205 In Perfect 10, if the 
server test was used, only the third-party website would be a direct infringer. This is 
because Google's image cache only stores a link to the third-party website, and the third­
party website sends the ones and zeros to the user's computer. Therefore, only the third 
party site "displays" the image. 
Under the incorporation test, "display" is the act of incorporating content into the web 
page by using an in-line link, whereby the in-line link causes the content to be pulled up by 
the browser. 206 Google uses an in -line link. Through this link, Google directs users to third­
party infringing websites to read the digital bits and place them on the computer screen. 
Therefore, under the incorporation test, Google would be liable for direct infringement. 
1 9� Id. at 1120-21. 
EJ:l Id. at 1121-23. 
1 91 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
1 95 Id. at 832. 
HJG Id. at 834. 
1 97 Id. at 832-33 & n.4. 
1 98 Id. at 833. 
EJ9 Id. at 833-34. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 838 ("'In· line link' refers to the process whereby a webpage can incorporate by reference (and 
arguably cause to be displayed) content stored on another website. "). 
20� Id. at 834. 
20:3 Id. at 838. "To establish direct copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) 
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) violation of one of the exclusive rights granted under copyright. " Id. 
The Copyright Act defines six exclusive rights of copyright holder, including the right "to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) ( 2005). 
204 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
205 Id. at 839. 
206 Id. at 839-40. 
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The court in Perfect 10 adopted the server test for direct infringement and held that 
Google, by using the in-line link, did not directly infringe the copyright.207 It held that this 
test was easy to apply, and that it placed primary responsibility for the infringement upon 
the party most responsible for it, the third-party infringer.208 The court noted, however, that 
under its holding, Google is only free from liability unless and until Google learns that it is 
infringing. Once Google has been put on notice of infringement, it could be found 
contributorily liable for maintaining the link209 and for failing to disable access to it under 
the Section 512 notice-and-take-down provisions.210 
The second issue the court considered was whether production and display of the 
thumbnail was infringement.211  The court again applied the server test, but this time the 
result favored Perfect 10.212 In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., a Ninth Circuit case in 2003, the 
reproduction and display of thumbnail versions of Kelly's images by an image search engine 
was held to be a fair use.213 That situation is distinguishable from Perfect 10, however, 
because Kelly had put his own photographs on his own website, and therefore had a weaker 
claim for relief. Here, Perfect 10 has its own website, but it is a subscription-only website 
that is not searchable ; the infringing image came from an infringing third-party website. 
In response to the infringement claims lodged by Perfect 10, Google asserted the fair-use 
defense.214 In deciding if fair use was applicable, the court focused on the first factor, the 
purpose and character of the use, and on the fourth factor, the effect of the use on the 
potential market for the copyrighted work.215 The court distinguished Kelly in part because 
Google sponsors ads that appear on third-party websites.21G The court reasoned that Google 
might receive revenue from people who are infringing on third-party websites, because 
Google sponsors ads on those websites.217 Furthermore, the thumbnail of the infringed 
image competes with authorized thumbnails sold by Perfect 10, because Perfect 10 actually 
sells thumbnail versions of its nude photographs to put on cell phones.218 Because Perfect 10 
actually sells thumbnails and Google provided them for free, the court held that Google was 
an infringer.219 
When one looks at this decision in light of the court's holding on the website issue, the 
result is counterintuitive. The Court held that the thumbnail was infringing, but that the 
full-sized image was not. It seems that it would be more reasonable to consider the 
thumbnail to be a fair use. The full-sized image might or might not be infringing, but it is 
clearly worse for the copyright owner than the thumbnail. 
1. Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Darling Kindersley Ltd. 
Finally, the Second Circuit recently affirmed Bill Graham Archives v. Darling 
Kindersley Ltd. , 220  holding that the unauthorized use of Grateful Dead concert posters in a 
biographical book was permissible as a fair use under 17 U.s.C. § 107. Bill Graham was a 
207 Id. at 843. 
208 Id. at 844. 
209 Id. 
210 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C), (c)(3). The notice·and·take·down provisions apply to caching and 
linking as well as hosting infringing material. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E), (d)(3). 
211 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 844. 
212 Id. 
2l:l See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811,822 (9th Cir. 2003). 
211 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 845. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
215 Id. at 845-49, 850-5l. 
216 Id. at 842. 
2 1 7  Id. at 846-47. 
218 Id. at 85l. 
219 Id. 
220 Bill Graham Archives v. Darling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2006). 
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famous concert promoter in the San Francisco Bay Area who commissioned numerous 
Grateful Dead concert posters, the copyrights of which are currently held by Bill Graham 
Archives ("BGA").221 In 2003, Dorling Kindersley ("DK" ) published Grateful Dead: The 
Illustrated Trip, which is a cultural history of the Grateful Dead, containing a chronological 
time line detailed with images and explanatory text.222 Initially, DK asked for permission to 
use several of BGA's Grateful Dead concert posters in the book.223 However, the parties were 
unable to agree on an appropriate licensing fee, and when DK published the images anyway 
without permission, BGA filed suit for copyright infringement.224 
Section 107 directs courts to consider four factors in determining whether a particular 
use is fair: "(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work."225 
The first factor, the purpose and character of the use, focuses on the transformative 
nature of the work.226 In other words, does the "new work merely supersede the objects of 
the original creation, or [does it add] something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."227 The court 
reasoned that DK's use of each image was transformative, because the purpose for the use of 
the images was different from the original purpose.22S The original images created by BGA 
were for artistic expression and promotion of the Grateful Dead, whereas the defendant 
created a biography and used the images both to illustrate the text and as historical artifacts 
to record the Grateful Dead's journey.229 Moreover, the style in which the posters were 
presented further transformed the originaP30 The size was significantly reduced, and the 
expressive value was diminished due to the addition of text, a timeline and other images.231 
Finally, despite the commercial nature of the book, the court held that DK did not seek to 
profit from exploitation of the images as such for commercial gain.232 
With regard to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, BGA agreed with 
the district court that the second factor weighed in BGA's favor because the images are 
creative artworks, but BGA contested the limited weight the district court afforded this 
factor. 233 The Second Circuit, however, agreed that the second factor was of limited 
221 Id. at 607, 609; see generally Wikipedia, Bill Graham (promoter), at http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiJ 
Bill_Graham_(promoter) (last visited Dec. 6, 2006). Licensed reproductions of concert posters from the Bill 
Graham Archives can now be purchased at Wolfgang's Vault, http://www.wolfgangsvault.com (last visited 
Dec. 6, 2006). 
222 Bill Graham A rchives, 448 F.3d at 607. 
22:3 Id. 
221 Id. at 607. BGA originally sought permission to make CDs and DVDs from concert footage in BGA's 
archives in exchange for the use of the concert posters. Id. When this failed, BGA offered to license the 
posters for $2,500 each, which was refused. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 
324, 326 (2005). 
225 Bill Graham A rchives, 448 F .3d at 608. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff·Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
228 Id. at 609. 
229 Id. at 609-10. The Court also recognized that DK's book is a biography, and noted that courts 
generally allow biographies fair use protection in using copyrighted material, as they are "forms of historic 
scholarship, criticism, and comment that require incorporation of original source material for optimum 
treatment of their subjects." Id. at 609; see also 17 U.s.C. § 107 (listing comment, criticism, and scholarship 
as among the illustrative purposes that may qualify as fair use). 
230 Bill Graham A rchives, 448 F.3d at 61l. 
2:3 1 Id. The thumbnail images account for less than one·fifth of one percent of the book. Id. They 
appear only on seven pages of the 480 page long book. Id. Furthermore, the largest reproduction is less than 
one·twentieth the size of the original. Id. 
2:32 Id. at 612. 
2:n Id. 
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usefulness, due to the transformative nature of the reproduction.234 Because DK emphasized 
the historical value of the images rather than their creative value, the district court properly 
limited the weight of the second factor.235 
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, also weighed in 
favor of DK.236 When analyzing this factor, it is necessary to examine the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the reproduction.237 Additionally, the extent of copying allowable 
under fair use depends on the purpose and character of the use. Even though DK reproduced 
the images in their entirety, the extent of this reproduction was minimized by the reduced 
size and was tailored to achieve the transformative purpose.238 Therefore, the Second Circuit 
held, that the amount and substantiality of the reproduction did not weigh against fair 
use.239 
Finally, in considering possible harm to the market, it is necessary to balance the 
benefit to the public against the personal gain of the copyright holder.240 The parties agreed 
that the use of the concert posters in the biography did not have an adverse effect on the 
primary market, which was the sale of reproductions of the posters.241 However, BGA 
alleged that DK's use impeded the market for licensing BGA images in books, which BGA 
claimed is a derivative market.242 The court, however, limited consideration of lost potential 
licensing proceeds to "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets."243 The 
court rejected BGA's argument that the fact that it had licensed reproductions to other 
publishers demonstrated the existence of a traditional licensing market, noting that those 
uses were substantially less transformative.244 Instead, the court held that a copyright 
holder cannot prevent fair use of its work by creating a licensing market for fair-use 
reproductions, and that a publisher's initial willingness to pay a licensing fee does not result 
in the forfeiture of fair-use rights.245 Therefore, even though BGA could have licensed these 
concert posters, the reproduction still qualified as fair use. 
After analyzing these four factors, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of DK. The transformative nature of DK's use 
of the concert posters was the primary reason that the reproduction was determined to be a 
fair use. This decision represents a significant departure from the Second Circuit's previous 
position that any use that substitutes for a potentially licensed use generally will not be 
deemed to be fair. It remains to be seen, however, whether the court can draw a principled 
line between those uses which require a licensing fee to be paid and those which will be 
deemed to be fair despite the non-payment of a licensing fee. 
2:31 Id. The Second Circuit distinguished the present case from Ringgold v. Black Entertainment 
Television, Inc. , 126 F .3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997), in which the reproduction was used for the same purpose as the 
original. I d. 
2:35 Id. at 612-13 . 
2:36 Id. at 613 .  
237 Id. 
2:38 Id. 
2:39 Id. 
240 Id. 
21 1 Id. at 614. 
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243 Id. 
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215 Id. 
